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SOME STRATEGIES FOR AN
UNLIKELY TASK: THE
PROGRESSIVE USE OF LAW
Harry J. Glasbeek*
The Knights of Labour was a powerful labour organization in late
nineteenth century North America. Its principles were rooted both in
religion and in the anti-capitalistic notion that wage labour was simply
an unacceptable social relationship. Its dream was to create a society
whose members could all act as truly sovereign individuals in the
production cycle. The Knights formed an all-embracing trade union to
which they were willing to admit anyone, with three notable occupa-
tional exceptions: people who had anything to do with the liquor trade
(this exclusion was related to the Knights' religious origins), bankers
and lawyers. They knew that capitalist law and its functionaries
defended everything they hated.
The Knights of Labour have gone; capitalism and its law remains.
I. INTRODUCTION
I was asked to speak on an issue such as "Whither the Law?"
In this presentation, I pose the question as to whether or not law can
be used progressively - that is, to further the causes of the disadvan-
taged. As I will be speaking to people who will soon be lawyers, I
have sought to formulate responses to the questions as to what it is
that impedes practitioners from using law progressively and as to what
kinds of tactics are available to practitioners who have such a laudable
objective.
II. EVERYDAY DimCULTmS IMPEDING THE PROGRESSIVE USE OF LAW
The victims of repression, oppression, discrimination, deporta-
tions, evictions and denials of compensation and welfare are all around
us. This is so despite the fact there are many statutes, and even some
judicial pronouncements, which purport to afford protections against
attacks on the poor, the old, the injured, the unemployed, women,immigrants, native peoples and other politically weak and economically
deprived segments of the population. This troubles people with a social
conscience. Many of these socially conscious people are lawyers and
some (not all that many) practice law in order to redress the plight of
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the disadvantaged. Because they are lawyers, they very often tend to
treat these victims of capitalism as victims of law. There is an
inclination to believe that problems arise because either the law does
not provide a protection it could afford, or because courts and admin-
istrative agencies interpret, apply and administer existing protective
legal schemes wrongly or meanly. Lawyers who want to improve
conditions for these victims thus tend to concentrate their activities on
two major fronts; they push both for the introduction of laws which
will yield better benefits and for the better implementation of existing
laws. They join networks, lobby groups and political parties, and they
appear before legislative committees and the like. They also try to
bring claims to courts and tribunals in the hope that, by highlighting
the gaps either found in legislative protection or caused or perpetuated
by supposedly neutral judges and agencies, they will educate the public
and politicians and buttress their own calls for legal change. That is,
they participate in electoral and group-interest politics and in legalized
politics. Being lawyers, they do more of the latter than of the former.
All of this is necessary, but is it enough?
On the face of it, the answer must be "NO". After all, as noted,
the very problems that are sought to be solved persist, despite these
valiant efforts. From a theoretical point of view, the answer must also
be "NO". In part, this is because the very tactics used by progressive
lawyers are also available to the immediate opposition - lawyers
who, in their private lives, might see themselves as having as much
of a social conscience as anyone else but who, in their professional
lives, act as champions for those who have the most to gain from
maintaining the status quo. It is this status quo which impinges so
nastily on the quality of life of the marginalized people, that is, on
those people who are to benefit from the progressive lawyers' endeav-
ours. These non-progressive (dare I say anti-progressive?) lawyers also
push for legal change. The changes they seek are meant to result in
the better implementation of existing legal schemes from their clien-
tWle's perspectives. They, too, belong to networks, lobby groups and
political parties, and appear before legislative committees and the like
to try to get the kinds of laws their clients want and need. They, too,
can bring clever, bold and novel arguments to courts and tribunals,
thereby educating the public and the politicians and creating a climate
for the development of what they see as an ideal state of the law.
The wealthy classes' lawyers are not better lawyers than those
who act on behalf of the oppressed sectors of society. Neither are they
worse lawyers. They do, however, have great advantages in legal
contests:
(i) Lawyers for wealthy people have clients who can pay. They need
not rely on the state's willingness to fund their battles against the
state. Here, I interrupt the flow of the argument to make an incidental,
but nonetheless important, point. One of the most serious difficulties
in seeking to use the law as a weapon to relieve oppression is that the
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immediate enemy will, all too often, be perceived to be the state.
Progressive lawyers are mostly engaged in attacking the state for its
lack of proper respect for their clients or for its miserliness in the
administration and/or provision of benefits. What is frequently lost
from sight is that these state-created benefit schemes have usually been
established to mitigate the more obviously harmful effects of capital-
ism. I do not have the time to tease out the argument fully. It suffices
to note that, for instance, people are not unemployed merely because
there is no worthwhile work to be done. Rather, in a private ordering
system, the job of creating employment falls to those with private
means. If they cannot see a profitable way to deploy their means
which also requires employing people, they will not create employ-
ment. On another front, race, ethnicity, nationality, gender, and other
such characteristics cause people to have different interests. This may
lead them to engage in, and suffer from, discriminatory practices, no
matter what the nature of the political economy under which they live.
There is evidence, however, that the owners of private wealth profit
greatly from emphasizing the differences and distinctions between
people. The point here is that, while individual capitalists may not be
racist or sexist, they may nonetheless gain a great deal from a society
which fosters the fragmentation of the population into minorities which
have to compete with one another. Hence, targetting the state as the
oppressor of these minorities - which constitutes much of progressive
lawyers' work - shields capitalism and, all too often, particular
capitalists from scrutiny and challenge.' To return:
(ii) The fact that progressive lawyers must rely on the state for funds
to launch their clientele's challenges to the law has a profound influence
on what these lawyers do. The state is reluctant to provide much
funding for direct attacks on its schemes and plans or to support efforts
which require it to set up new and costly programmes. It is even more
reluctant to fund the politicization of communities, groups of tenants
or of the unemployed. That is, the state is not eager to fund activities
which, potentially, are electorally embarrassing; it is dead-set against
funding organizations which want to bring about radical change. An-
yone who has ever done any legal clinical work knows the pressures
this generates. There are endless debates between clients, paralegals
I For good discussions of the constitution of minorities and the utility of this
to capitalism, see E. Laclau, POLITCS AND IDEOLOGY IN MARXISTS' THEORY (London:
NLB, 1977); C. Leys, J. Saul & E. Laclau, POPULISM AND POPULAR IDEOLOGIES
(Toronto: Latin American Research Unit, 1980); R. Breton, Ethnic Stratification
Viewed from Three Theoretical Perspectives in J. Curtis & W. Scott, eds, SocIAL
STRATIFCATION: CANADA, 2d ed. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1979); G. Filson,
Class and Ethnic Differences in Canadians' Attitudes to Native People's Rights and
Immigration (1983) 20 CAN. REv. OF SOCIOLoGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 454; H. Glas-
beek, A No-Frills Look at the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or How Politicians
and Lawyers Hide Reality (1989) 9 WINDSOR Y.B. AccEss JusT. [forthcoming].
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and lawyers as to whether grassroots political organization should be
fostered or whether winning entitlements for particular clients and,
occasionally, bringing test cases should be emphasized. Such discus-
sions are conditioned by the way the clinic is funded. Given this
framework, it is easy to understand why progressive lawyers, influ-
enced by the socialization they have endured at law school and as
members of the profession, will not frequently advocate direct political
action and will come to see judicial struggles against the state as the
cutting edge of political activity.2 Concentration on the courts as a
terrain of struggle makes it even more difficult than it otherwise might
be to use the law progressively. I will elaborate this point later.
(iii) In addition to the difference in the source of their resources, there
is also a sizeable gap between the number of resources available to
progressive and non-progressive lawyers. This does not only mean that
lawyers representing dominant-interest groups have greater access to
the fora through which legal change may be promoted or the admin-
istration of law sought to be upgraded. It also means that these
dominant-interest lawyers have more time to work on specific issues.
They have more books, more computers and more people who are
well paid to do research; they can travel more and buy more experts;
they can attend more conferences where they may mingle with impor-
tant decision-makers, and so on.
(iv) When dominant-interest lawyers make arguments on behalf of
their clienthle, they are known to represent people who are well
connected to law-givers, administrators and adjudicators. Their clients,
in popular parlance, are pillars of the community; they are business
leaders and entrepreneurs whose endeavours benefit all of Canada.
More pertinently, they donate to political parties. While wealthy people,
just like poor people, send delegations to appear before legislative
committees, they also call on ministers in person or have ministers
attend on them in person. They are the ruling class. No matter how
much credence one may want to give the conventional assumption that
the legal system is neutral, there can be little doubt that people who
make (legally) clever and acceptable arguments on behalf of such a
clienthle start with an advantage in that they will naturally get a more
sympathetic hearing. This is also true, perhaps particularly true, when
the forum is a court or an administrative agency staffed by people
culled from the ranks of the professions (more often than not the legal
profession). If this needs illustration, ask yourself: how many judges
2 For a discussion of the socialization of lawyers in law schools, see text
accompanying notes 12 and 13. See generally H. Glasbeek & R. Hasson, Some
Reflections on Canadian Legal Education (1987) 50 MOD. L. REV. 777.
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has the Law Union of Ontario movement spawned? How are judges
selected and from whose ranks?3 These questions are rhetorical.
Here I pause again. I believe that I have recently detected an
undue rush of enthusiastic blood to the collective head of legal prac-
titioners who want to promote progressive causes. The reason: the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Yet, caution is needed. The exposi-
tion, so far, has shown that anti-progressive forces have built-in
advantages when going to court and, therefore, when employing the
Charter. They have more funds and their claims strike a more respon-
sive chord with judges. Apart from class identification with rich
litigants, there is an institutional reason for this empathy. My colleague,
Reuben Hasson, has made the point neatly. He argues that much of
the legislation which adversely affects would-be progressive lawyers'
3 A variety of studies has shown that appellate court judges have had close
ties and relations with the dominant political parties, have never been trial judges
(that is, have come straight out of practice to the superior court benches) and that,
until recently, for every three people appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, two
have come from the corporate-commercial side of practice for every one who has
come from the criminal, civil libertarian side. See, e.g., D. Olsen, THE STATE ELrrE
(Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1980) at 42-64. The superior court judges are vital
role models for lower level trial court judges.
An interesting way to get a feel for the way trial judges are likely to behave
is by taking a glance at their self-perception. In August 1985, the Globe and Mail
reported that the Canadian Bar Association believed that judicial salaries were a
scandal and should be raised from $94,000 to $119,000 per annum. The Bar
Association was quoted as saying, "[t]he present situation is absolutely unacceptable
and is doing the Canadian judges a glaring injustice." M. Strauss, "Judges' Salaries
an Injustice" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (19 August 1985) A8. Presumably, the
idea is that decent lawyers cannot be attracted away from their lucrative practices to
become judges and that we may get only mediocre members of the profession offering
themselves for elevation to the judiciary. To equate "good" with "highly paid" is,
of course, a natural extension of capitalist logic. As only people who work for, and
accept the values of, the rich can believe that $100,000 per year is chicken feed, the
nature of a judiciary's bias, drawn from such ranks, becomes manifest. This point is
emphasized by yet another report on the anger felt by provincial court judges in
Ontario. They are upset because their salaries, at $81,500, are well below those of
provincial court judges in several other jurisdictions, way below those of Supreme
Court justices and not as high as those recommended by an independent consultant.
The latter's recommendation was that judges' salaries should be in line with what
they could have been expected to earn in private practice - about $105,000 annually
in 1987 dollars. The judges are talking about striking because they feel that their
needs are being flagrantly ignored, thus denoting a lack of respect for their work. K.
Makin, "Provincial Court Judges Seek Ways to Push for Better Pay Conditions" The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail (14 April 1989) A14. Note the comparison groups they
use. At the very least, this story reflects a serious problem for progressive lawyers
who hope that they can make judges appreciate the plight of their clientele. For
theoretical arguments to the effect that this kind of identification with the disadvan-
taged is a way that the judiciary can become a force for positive, democratic change,
see generally B. Wilson, The Making of a Constitution: Approaches to Judicial
Interpretation [1988] PUBLIC LAW 370 and M. Minow, The Supreme Court 1986
Term - Foreword: Justice Engendered (1987) 101 HARV. L. REv. 10.
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clientele - for example, insurance and consumer law - would not
have become law unless it were acceptable to business groups. Indeed,
the consumer's voice is not often heard in the law-creating process
and, if heard, is very muffled. Once enacted, more often than not, the
remedies needed to overcome the adverse impacts of the law require
the taking of positive steps - for instance, enacting better consumer
protection legislation, lowering interest rates or providing greater ben-
efits.4 It is unclear whether that sort of relief will be forthcoming from
courts. 5 It is much easier for progressive lawyers to persuade courts
to set aside a section of such a law because it discriminates against a
person or group or because its implementation denies rights of due
process. In contrast, business groups who want relief from the effects
of what they believe to be overly-generous social legislation (such as
that which sets minimum labour standards, provides unemployment
insurance benefits, requires food and drug testing and labelling, sets
occupational health and safety standards) do not require positive de-
cisions. They will only have to argue that the legislation is unconsti-
tutional. It is a lot easier for a court to agree with this than to fashion
a remedy that requires elected officials to make an allocation of
resources in order to render it effective. 6 As Hasson points out, the
4 See R.A. Hasson, The Charter and Social Legislation, Address at the
Edinburgh Conference on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 21 May
1988 [available on request]. See also R.A. Hasson, How to Hand Weapons to Your
Enemies - The Charter of Rights Fiasco (June 1982) No. 5 STEELSHOTS [available
on request], a particularly prescient piece as it was the only one written before the
Charter was proclaimed which indicated that the corporate sector would be the
greatest beneficiary of Charter largesse. Professor Hasson has been proven right.
5 In a recent aside, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that "[p]ublic funding
of daycare facilities is a social problem which is beyond the reach of the court." R.
v. King (1988), 64 O.R. (2d) 768 at 774, 50 D.L.R. (4th) 564 at 569. It was a neat
summation of the endemic problem posited in the text.
6 In these Charter days, it is conventional wisdom that the courts will take a
more progressive approach towards such issues because the document itself, the
Charter, instructs them and educates them to that effect. It is useful, therefore, to
note the history of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L.Ed.
873 (1954) [hereinafter Brown v. Board of Education]. This case is usually perceived
as the high water mark of progressive judicial intervention in the United States. The
American Supreme Court ordered the integration of schools, with all deliberate speed,
thereby fanning the hope of the anti-discrimination forces. In 1981, a case was
making its way through the courts in which the local residents of a municipality were
asking the courts to enforce Brown v. Board of Education against their local school
board's trustees who had not integrated the local schools to their satisfaction. The
county in which this was occurring was Topeka county, the very county which had
given rise to the Brown v. Board of Education litigation. See R.A.L. Gambitta,
Litigation, Judicial Deference and Policy Change in R.A.L. Gambitta, M.L. May &
J.C. Foster, eds, GovERNNG THRouGH CouRTs (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981). In
Canada, too, some lower court decisions have shown that positive decisions in courts
do not necessarily cause legislatures to implement these decisions. Indeed, the contrary
may be true. See, e.g., the legislative history of Phillips v. Social Assistance Appeal
Bd (N.S.) (1986), 76 N.S.R. (2d) 240, (sub nom. A.G. Nova Scotia v. Phillips) 34
D.L.R. (4th) 633 (S.C.A.D.); Reference re Family Benefits Act (N.S.), Section 5
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irony of all of this is that, very frequently, well-heeled business
applicants will be able to claim the costs of such litigation as a
business expense. This is seldom possible for impoverished claimants.
In sum, because of who progressive lawyers are, and because of
the source and relative lack of funding, they will find it hard to get
new legislation and legal interpretations and applications which will
constitute breakthroughs for their clientele. Their difficulties are com-
pounded by the fact that both the law and decision-makers' interests
and predilections are much closer to those of progressive lawyers'
opponents. More importantly, the forum in which they concentrate
their efforts is not institutionally designed to make the kinds of
dispositions which are needed.
This pessimistic outlook has been offered in response to an as
yet unchallenged premise that changes in, or different interpretations
and applications of, the law can confer valuable, positive benefits. But
that premise is contentious. In part, it raises empirical issues; in part,
it raises the theoretical question as to whether the existing legal system
is capable of yielding anything but relatively minor ameliorations.
III. BuILT-IN LIMITATIONS ON CHANGING THE WORLD BY THE USE OF
STANDARD LAWYERS' LAW
In this section, I want to raise three interrelated points. The first
is self-evident. It is not easy to predict whether or not an attempt at
legislative or judicial reform will yield the benefits sought. Second,
assuming that there are reformist legal rules and readings which are
capable of alleviating the plight of the disadvantaged and the oppressed
and assuming that progressive lawyers have an important role to play
in obtaining such favourable legislation and decisions, it is plausible
that lawyers' involvement may have a fettering effect on the possibility
of obtaining more profound changes, the kinds of changes which the
disadvantaged and oppressed need to become true sovereign partici-
pants in our society. This raises the third point. It is my argument that
while some reforms are obtainable through judicial activity, they are
limited in scope and impact because fundamental changes cannot be
yielded by our legal system. The ultimate purpose of law is to prevent
radical change and, most importantly, the judiciary has a leading part
(1986), 75 N.S.R. (2d) 338, 186 A.P.R. 338 (S.C.A.D.); Silano v. British Columbia
(1987), 42 D.L.R. (4th) 407, [1987] 5 W.W.R. 739 (B.C.S.C.), and the uncertainty
resulting from the holding in Schachter v. Canada, [1988] 18 ET.R. 199, 3 EC. 515
(T.D.). See also the discussions in J. Fudge, The PubliclPrivate Distinction: The
Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation in Further Feminist
Struggles (1987) 25 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 485 and A. Petter, Legitimizing Social
Inequality: The Early Charter Cases (1989) 34 McGILL L.J. 358. This is not to
suggest that Brown v. Board of Education had no effect, or no progressive effect,
but it reminds us that getting a favourable judicial decision is not the same as getting
a favourable political result.
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to play in the maintenance of the general status quo. This poses a
fourth and very troubling question: what should progressive lawyers
do? This last issue will be tackled in the final section of this paper.
A. Measuring the Benefits of Reformist Law
When progressive lawyers seek to have legislation or a rule of
law altered it is done in the belief that the enactment of a new law
and its application, or the adoption of a new reading of the law, will
have particular effects. But there is, in fact, no certainty that particular
rules and decisions will have the consequences we hope they will
have. For example, a ruling which says that employers shall not be
racist may or may not have an effect on employers' attitudes towards
racism. If we could be sure that the very existence of such a legal
pronouncement would have a positive effect of this kind, we could
say that the passing of the law or the making of the ruling has a direct
effect. But, our concern with such a rule in real life is whether or not
it forces employers to stop practising racism. We therefore must
scrutinize the new legal ruling's likely and actual effect on the people
charged with administering it. Are enforceable rights created? Are
means of enforcement put in place? Are these functioning well, thereby
reducing racist practices in employment? The fact is that we cannot
know, at the time of its creation, whether a legal rule or ruling will
have a particular effect, no matter what its appearance and language
suggest. Allocation of resources, the nature of the existing and poten-
tially changing political will, attendant publicity, acceptability of the
ideology embedded in the rule or ruling, will all play a part in
determining its impact. The point is simple. The obtaining of a
reformist rule or ruling is something to which a progressive lawyer
can contribute. This is useful in its own right, but will never be
enough. It may even have a "downside".
B. The Schizophrenic Aspect of the Progressive Lawyer's Role
Once a political decision is couched in legal form, lawyers will
be involved. 7 One certain outcome of couching a political decision in
legal form is that it will be mediated by existing legal culture. This
includes the likelihood that the rule will be interpreted by reference to
existing legal categories and rhetoric. For instance, the word "reason-
able" will be interpreted in line with concepts of "reasonableness"
found elsewhere in the law.8 More importantly, it will mean that the
7 See generally J. Griffiths, Is Law Important? (1979) 54 N.Y.U. L. REv.
339. This section and the previous section of the paper rely a great deal on this very
informative article.
8 I do not have to tell lawyers that this gives any one interpreter a great deal
of room to manoeuvre. For one account of the indeterminate nature of legal cultural
interpretation, see generally H.J. Glasbeek & R.A. Hasson, Fault - The Great Hoax
in L. Klar, ed., STUDIEs iN CANADANr TORT LAW (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977) 395.
[Vol. 21:2
The Progressive Use of Law
interpretation and application of the rule will be based on rationality,
rather than being political and/or subjective in nature. This is the result
of moving the struggle from the sphere of interest and electoral politics
into the judicial and quasi-judicial domains. Associated with this
transportation and transformation of struggle will be an emphasis on
the need for due process and the enhancement of participatory rights
for those who are to be subjected to the rule of law as applied by the
courts. All of this is often - usually, if the observers are lawyers -
perceived as a positive development because the weak will be given
due consideration by rational, neutral decision-makers. Thus, it may
be that an important aspect of casting a political decision in legal form
is that the ensuing legal politics and prestige of the legal profession
endow the political decision with a legitimacy it might not otherwise
have. It makes political decision-making acceptable to the electorate,
precisely because the implementation of the political decision appears
to be non-political.
Certainly, a lot of the trappings of our profession, our tribunals,
our mythologies about the separation of power within government and
our notion of the political independence of legal decision-makers, all
seem to be aimed at achieving this effect. Note here that many of the
challenges which are made by progressive lawyers are challenges which
seek to enhance participatory rights and to provide for a fairer process
of decision-making by obliging executive officers, agencies, decision-
makers and tribunals to play by the rules devised to create fairer
processes and better participatory rights. 9 Progressive lawyers, there-
9 Eighty to ninety percent of Charter litigation is concerned with the legal
rules of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; see generally EL. Morton, The Political
Impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1987) 20 CAN. J. POL. SCI.
31ff; see also P. Monahan, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHARTER. FEDER-
ALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 33ff. These
cases are ones in which the state and its agents, rather than private property owners,
are the enemies. Moreover, they are cases in which wide-ranging language can be
used to express our society's belief in respect for the dignity of all individuals and
in the citizenry's complete freedom, and our society's abhorrence of arbitrary brutality
and oppression. But in no way does this kind of decision-making affect what conduct
is characterized as criminal and this is vital. Such definitions and the state's allocation
of resources to criminal law enforcement lead to poor people, racially different people
and politically troublesome people being subjected to the coercive powers of the state
far more than members of the dominant classes. While there is neither time nor space
to elaborate on this straightforward point, it is of some significance that progressive
lawyers have gained much hope for the potential of Charter litigation because the
possibility of mounting challenges to the state and its functionaries has become a
reality in this setting and, therefore, it is assumed, in other spheres. Yet, caution
ought to be exercised. Despite the judges' Charter-inspired rhetoric of respect for the
dignity of suspected and accused persons, Canada's prison population, overwhelm-
ingly constituted of the members of progressive lawyers' clientele, is increasing.
Mandel has calculated that, per 100,000 of population, there are as many people
incarcerated in Canada today as there were during the Great Depression. See generally
M. Mandel, READINGS IN CRIMINOLOGY (Teaching Materials, Osgoode Hall Law
19891
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fore, contribute to the enhancement of the legitimacy of political
decision-making once it takes on an appropriate form - a legal form.
In sum, to obtain a specific legislative or judicial reform may be
worthwhile; it may turn out well. It may even be useful to achieve
less tangible results. Thus, to demonstrate in court that the state of
the law victimizes the poor or favours the rich may lead to beneficial
changes or, at least, may raise political consciousness about some
important issues. Progressive lawyers may be able to make important
contributions in some or all of these ways. But these efforts will
necessarily support the legitimacy of the legal system and, more
particularly, the judiciary as an institution. What if, in the end, the
legal system, and more particularly the judiciary, are there to make
sure that the dominant classes remain dominant and the exploited
remain exploited? These are the horns of a well-known dilemma.
C. Law and Essential Relationships in Capitalism
While most legal rules could be turned upside down without
seriously affecting power relationships in a capitalist society, this is
not true of all such rules: some are vital to the working of capitalism.
Let me demonstrate this to this legal audience in a way which, I trust,
will underscore how an idealized version of competitive capitalism,
unencumbered by reference to the actual workings of Canada's capi-
talism (dominated as it is by non-competitive actors), is embedded in
the fabric of the matter which you study and practise as law.
Milton Friedman's capitalism envisages an economic society in
which every individual can decide for himselflo how he should utilize
his abilities and resources. The most efficient use will be that which
will give him a maximum return and which will enable him to purchase
everything he wants from others behaving in a similarly ideal fashion.
In a society in which this occurs, all demands for goods or services
will be met if a return on production or delivery can be garnered by
School, 1987) [unpublished]. This is startling because contemporary governments
hold themselves out to be wedded to a policy of decarceration. Further, Mandel shows
that there are as many people kept under state surveillance (parole, probation, half-
way houses, community service, etc.) as there are in gaols. This goes to the heart of
the argument in the text: getting better legal procedural rights may legitimate a system
which undermines substantive political rights. The Charter may be the cutting edge
of this trojan horse-like effect.
10 The masculine pronoun is chosen deliberately; the notion of human beings
as aggressively self-gratifying creatures harmonizes neatly with the image of "macho-
man" conquering everything and all around him. See generally C. Gilligan, IN A
DnFERENr Voice (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982).
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potential suppliers. If that return is large, in relative terms, other
rational economic actors will seek to enter into the same supply
business in order to obtain a share of this "excess" profit. The ensuing
competition will ensure efficient satisfaction of all demands, in the
sense that goods and services will be provided at the lowest possible
cost. An efficient mechanism for the allocation of resources is thus
provided. In this ideal economy, there is little need for the state to
impose rules, because people's freely chosen preferences will be
satisfied via the market mechanism. As most needs will be met in
accordance with personal preferences, there will be little need to tell
people what to do or how to do it. The need for political decision-
making by central authorities is reduced sharply, and indeed, rendered
relatively negligible.
Government, however, will still be needed to ensure that there is
a free market. The idea of competition is that there shall be winners
and losers. Monopolies might result. By definition, monopolists, as
rational maximizing individuals, will exploit their non-competitive
position to the detriment of the promotion and maintenance of an ideal
market economy. As individuals can only exercise sovereignty in a
truly free market, this is not acceptable, neither economically nor
politically. Furthermore, for individuals to be able to act as much as
possible like idealized market actors, there must be accurate and
costless information so that everyone will know what to demand and
how much to pay for it. The state, therefore, is to ensure restrictions
on anti-competitive practices and to provide for a free flow of non-
misleading information. Our state has enacted laws which seek to
attain these objectives. This is acceptable, indeed necessary, to the
ideology of free enterprise. More than this kind of patrolling of the
market by government, however, would make the state a wanton
interventionist. The starting point, then, is that the state will undermine
economic and political liberty if it goes beyond the boundaries which
stem from the logic of the economic system itself. That logic, however,
does mandate some other state imposed-rules and laws.
The system requires that there be people out there who have the
capacity to act as sovereign, maximizing individuals who, by exercising
their free will over nature, are enabled to act as agents of supply and
demand. To this end, law creates juridical autonomy and equality. Our
law, therefore, creates rules which bolster the idea that every person
is equal to all others, regardless of their starting position, their actual
abilities and their resources. Transactions between people are, therefore,
the unquestionable outcome of the exercise of their sovereign, free
will and, as such, deserve the support of the legal system. Moreover,
for this economic model to work, these juridically equal individuals
must be able to control resources so that they can use them as they
see fit: to consume them, meeting their own demands, or to supply
other individuals' demands. They also need to be able to assert private
property rights. It is important to note that it does not matter what the
rules defining private property rights are, provided they are relatively
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certain and constant at any one time.11 The question of how such
property rights were originally acquired turns out not to be a burning
question. We can start from an existing position and go forward from
there. That is what we do.
But having the capacity to own property is not enough. A major
premise of the scheme is that there shall be exchanges of property or
of the products of that property's exploitation. It is necessary to
determine, therefore, when an exchange begins and when it ends, in
order to permit the supply and demand regime to remain in perpetual
motion. The law of contract has now found a raison d'etre. Again, it
does not matter all that much what the actual rules of contract are,
provided that they are relatively certain and constant at any one time.
Because the legal system pays no attention, in theory, as to who
has property and who has not and as to why that might be so, property
has come to be unequally divided. There is, therefore, a strong
temptation for those who do not have any property to seize it from
others who do, so that they too might participate profitably in market
activities. But this does not fit well with market ideology: there would
be no certainty with respect to property ownership and this would be
a disincentive to the efficient use of property. It follows that property-
holders should have rights which protect that property from forcible
takings. To a large extent, criminal law serves that function.
Another problem for the model is that, for the supply-demand
exchanges to be efficient, all costs of production must be included in
the prices charged for goods and services, else the goods and services
will be underpriced, thus increasing demands for them when efficient
allocation of resources might very well mandate another use of prop-
erty. To illustrate: if nickel mining causes acid rain, the price of nickel
ought to reflect the cost of cleaning up the environment, lest nickel be
underpriced in the direct supply-demand exchange. This underpricing
will occur precisely because the suppliers and demanders are rational
actors; unless third parties affected by the production of nickel have a
means of shifting the costs which pollution imposes on them to the
exchangers, the exchangers will pursue the less costly course of
pollution. This internalizing of costs can be achieved by direct gov-
ernment intervention (the regulation of neighbourhood effects) or by
allowing third parties to bring an action against the producers. The
law of torts has just raised its head.
As an academic who is long in the tooth, I can tell the boring
story of my participation in an endless number of law school curricula
reviews, creating ever more options, advocating more clinical teaching,
teaching students how to be sensitive people, and so forth. However,
despite this great flurry of continuous activity and the seemingly
unabated interest in creating variations on a theme, no common law
11 The guru, Milton Friedman himself, acknowledges this point; see generally
M.R. Friedman, CAPrALiSM AND FREEDOM (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1962).
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school, to my knowledge, has abandoned any of the following subjects
from its core compulsory curriculum: property, contract, criminal law,
and torts. What a coincidence!12 Note what else these subjects have in
common: primarily, they pit individual against individual, without
differentiating between them in respect of their wealth and power. The
forum in which they are pitted against each other is the court, a state
emanation which is to be seen as separate from, and independent of,
the state. Although this is not as obviously true in the Canadian
criminal law sphere as it is with respect to property, contract and torts,
an analogous argument can be made with respect to criminal law. In
criminal cases, the state appears both as individual complainant and
as decision-maker, while preserving the myth that criminal justice is
administered by an independent decision-maker between individual
disputants. Some procedural safeguards are created to offset the great
power of the state. This dovetails with the ideology that a powerful
state is the enemy of private individuals, whereas powerful individuals
present no equivalent serious threat.
The foregoing goes some way towards explaining why it is that
the subjects of property, contract, criminal law and torts are part of
the core curriculum in all common law school teaching. Inasmuch as
these branches of law are functionally necessary to capitalism, law
school curricula reflect aspects of the essential relations of capitalism.
Lawyers are socialized from day one to accept the unvarying nature
of the verities embedded in these subjects - that is, the truths of a
capitalist political economy. Law students are exposed to subject-matter
overtly dealing with collective and/or public law subjects after they
have had this immense dose of ideological reinforcement. Furthermore,
when they do get around to these supposedly quite different subjects,
they will find that, for the most part, such subjects are taught on the
basis that they are, in fact, aberrations in the legal system. For example,
12 Note that the explanation the text offers for the inclusion of these "common
law" subjects in every curriculum in every law school in the country is far more
satisfactory than others available. These other explanations include such things as the
fact that these subjects are basic to the understanding of all other subjects. This
would only be true if law is taught on the basis of the understandings offered in the
text. This is not usual and the argument that these subjects are necessary prerequisites
becomes untenable. Another common justification for the inclusion of these subjects
as the core of all curricula is the fact that they are the historical basis for common
law. If this be so, one would have expected them to be taught historically. They are
not. Inasmuch as common law methodology and judicial reasoning have to be learned,
and these subjects are claimed to be the best vehicles, I would merely point out that
legal methodology and reasoning can be learned in any subject. Thus, do taxation
law or labour law not involve case analysis? That is, the commonly offered reasons
are empty ones, especially when they are put in the context of the actual teaching of
these subjects in law schools in Canada. For a more expanded argument to this effect,
see H.J. Glasbeek, Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as a Crime - The Need
to Make "Profits" a Dirty Word (1984) 22 OSGOoDE HALL L.J. 393; Menopausal
Musings of a Law Professor (1977) Tim ADVOCATE (Students' Law Society of the
University of Toronto) 6 [available on request]; Glasbeek and Hasson, supra, note 2.
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administrative law is usually presented in such a way as to suggest
that the major issue is whether or not boards and agencies protect and
guard individual rights, both substantive and procedural, in a way
acceptable to common law courts. Law students 13 are trained to see
statutory intervention as something which has to be controlled, pref-
erably by the judiciary; that is, by undemocratic, irresponsible tribun-
als,14 or at the very least overseen by agencies, such as labour relations
boards, which, in the end, exhibit the same respect as the courts do
for basic concepts such as individualism and private property.
The argument so far has been that progressive lawyers have less
resources than their opponents, and that they must go to institutions
which intuitively are more responsive to their opponents and are more
accustomed to giving the kind of redress they seek than that which
the progressive lawyers pursue. Moreover, the attempts to effect stat-
utory or regulatory changes, to enforce due process, to ask courts for
better dispositions (even when successful) will not, without more,
advance progressive causes because the fundamentals of capitalist
relations of production are unlikely to come under serious challenge
in this way. Capitalism is the real enemy. What must be done by
progressive lawyers, then, is to seek means by which to confront the
essential relations of capitalism as expressed in law; in particular, the
notions of juridical equality and the concepts and ideology of private
property and contract.
IV. TACTICS FOR THE PROGRESSIVE LAWYER
Law is not a revolutionary instrument. Would-be progressive
lawyers cannot kneecap capitalists with a writ. Moreover, in their
everyday work, they have to tackle the problems as they arise. By and
13 Legal professional rules and admission procedures are of such a kind that
they ensure that the bulk of law students are fertile ground for the sowing of such
seeds. Admission requirements ensure that law students are drawn from the wealthiest
(and most conservative) strata of society. Do not be fooled by the ten percent or so
of working class members of a law school. Most students come from professional or
"business" family backgrounds; see B.D. Adam and K. Lahey, Professional Oppor-
tunities: A Survey of the Legal Profession (1981) 59 CAN. BAR REv. 674.
14 My students often oppose my suggestions for legislative intervention schemes
- such as comprehensive compensation policies - on the basis that they are too
bureaucratic in nature. I am fond of telling them that nothing is more bureaucratic
than the judiciary. A bureaucrat may be described as a person who is not responsible
to the public in any direct sense. There is only an attenuated form of accountability
to an elected government official. By these standards judges must be seen as super-
bureaucrats. They are not .responsible to anyone, not even to elected politicians. The
worst thing that can happen to them is to be overruled by some fellow judge and,
even then, this will always be done on the basis that they have made an understandable
error in a very difficult and complex situation. There is no chance of their salary
being diminished, of their being dismissed, nor of their incompetence or biases
leading to any slowing of demand for their services. They are irresponsible, in the
true sense of the word, as well as unaccountable.
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large, they cannot set the agenda. This means that, more often than
not, law has to be used defensively; progressive lawyers will be
constrained to attempt to retain what has been won in the past, to fight
for better processes, to have nasty decisions set aside. Naturally, they
must do their best, but this is not enough. Occasionally, they will get
their opportunity to attack. When this happens, the focus should be
on confronting the legal bases which underlie capitalism. While the
problems for the progressive use of law outlined earlier remain because
such confrontations will largely take place in the courts and adminis-
trative agencies of the state, the idea is to have an organizing principle.
This organizing principle, following the argument made, should be to
attack the legal underpinnings which favour the rich over the poor, or
more precisely, wealth owners over the property-less. Inasmuch as the
state furthers this domination and inequality, it can be the target of
such challenges, but it should always remain clear who the real
oppressor is. This means that no single reform attained is ever enough.
It should be made clear that it is only acceptable for the moment -
further attacks are warranted if the causes of oppression and inequality
remain. Exhortation of this kind is easy. We must ask what tactics are
required to translate theoretical slogans into action.
The first thing to identify is what this approach negates: reliance
on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as a positive tool. In addition
to the difficulties referred to earlier (namely that, while the judiciary
can give symbolic victories it is seldom willing or able to bestow
material gains), it must also be remembered that the Charter is an
instrument reflecting liberal capitalist values which are entrusted to an
institution whose historic mission it is to maintain the status quo. In
particular:
(i) The fundamental rights and freedoms which it purports to guarantee
and on which most of the progressive lawyers' claims will be based,
are characterized by the fact that they are abstract and universal in
nature;
(ii) The role of giving these abstract rights content falls to the judiciary.
Two quick points, in addition to the others already made in this talk,
must be made. First, the judiciary did not, in several centuries of
common law decision-making, develop any of these abstract, political
rights. To the contrary. They are rights which have their origin in
extra-legal activities, in revolutionary movements, specifically the French
and American revolutions. Our courts have never shown much incli-
nation to reinforce them. This leads to the second point: inasmuch as
claimants to such rights have come to court and their claims have
clashed with the interests of private property owners, courts have
protected the latter. Why should progressive lawyers believe that this
will change? Possibly, they think that the manifest rhetorical goals of
the Charter, aided by rational argument, will lead to a more progressive
approach by the courts. I will not stop to meet this argument head-on
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but simply note that the goals of the Charter are far from easy to
discern and, further, that there is no compelling evidence which
underpins an argument that something called rational argument has
ever had much sway in the courts. In any event, the results thus far
indicate that the hoped-for new approach by the courts has not emerged.15
15 See Glasbeek, supra, note 1. There is no particular reason to believe that
Canadians now have more free speech rights than they did before the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms was enshrined. In particular, have Canadians won the right to
more public space in which to exercise this right? Have the owners of the mass
communication media given up the almost total monopoly they have had for a long
time on news and opinion dissemination in this country? See H.J. Glasbeek, En-
trenchment of Freedom of Speech for the Press - Fettering of Freedom of Speech of
the People in P. Anisman and A.M. Linden, eds, THE MEDIA, THE COURTS AND THE
CHARTER (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 101, where the effect of this monopoly on the
exercise of freedom of speech in Canada is discussed. On the other hand, it is true
that some censoring boards have been curtailed: see Re Ontario Film and Video
Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80, 38
C.R. (3d) 271 (C.A.), leave to appeal granted (1984), 3 O.A.C. 318; and that Nazis
have been able to attack restrictive legislation seeking to inhibit the propagation of
hatred: R. v. Zundel (1987), 58 O.R. (2d) 129, 31 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (C.A.) (legislation
valid); R. v. Keegstra (1988), 43 C.C.C. (3d) 150, [1988] 5 W.W.R. 211 (Alta C.A.)
(hate propaganda provisions invalid), leave to appeal granted [1989] 4 W.W.R. lxx.
Compare R. v. Andrews (1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 161, 43 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (C.A.) leave
to appeal granted (1989), 68 O.R. (2d) x. It is also true that the corporate sector
has been enabled to attack legislative efforts to restrict advertising; the effects of
these attacks are still incalculable. After the recent decision in Irwin Toy Ltd v.
Quibec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, it is clear that advertising
is to be regarded as an exercise in free speech. The tobacco industry is gearing up
to use this to defend its right to advertise the dangerous drug it sells. Similarly, it is
still a matter of serious legal contention as to whether or not a trade union can raise
funds for political purposes, a right which was not challenged before the advent of
the Charter. At the moment, a union seems to have the upper hand in one such
piece of litigation: see Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U. (1989), 67 O.R. (2d) 536, 56 D.L.R.
(4th) 474 (C.A.), but the matter has not been finalized. The Supreme Court of
Canada has yet to speak. Further, the Ontario Court of Appeal decision is based on
the fact that what a union did was a matter of private law. This is both contentious
in law and, more significantly, politically undesirable from a union's perspective.
There is no doubt, however, that bodies such as the National Citizens' Coalition now
have the freedom to express themselves on political issues, free from the would-be
restrictions of electoral financing legislation: see National Citizens' Coalition Inc. v.
A.G. Canada, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 436, 32 Alta L.R. (2d) 249 (Q.B.).
In another sphere, there seems to be no evidence that Canadians enjoy more
freedom of religion than they ever did. Certainly, one group of serious people whose
religion dictated that their children should undergo a non-conformist school experience
were denied this right to exercise their strongly and sincerely held religious preference:
see R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 513. Is this anti-religious
freedom holding offset by the fact that a corporation's freedom to open a store on
Sunday was upheld by a purposive reading of the same phrase, "freedom of religion",
by the Supreme Court of Canada? I refer to R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 385, affjg (1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 310, [1983] 1 W.W.R.
625 (Alta C.A.).
On yet another front, neither the workers' right to associate, nor their freedom
of speech when it takes the form of picketing have been enhanced by the Charter:
see Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery
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This is not such a puzzle if we remember the second feature of the
guaranteed rights and freedoms - their universality;
(iii) Universality means that all individuals have a rightful claim to
these rights and freedoms. This suits the disadvantaged as they are not
to be met by arguments that they have. no entitlements of this abstract
kind. It also means, however, that property owners can make those
same claims. The imbalance of resources now raises its head; so also
does the bias of the judiciary, peopled by persons who, for the most
part, have spent their professional lives serving the propertied classes.
Most important, the concept that the abstract Charter rights belong to
all formally equal persons means that the assumptions of the common
law which reflect capitalism's needs are embedded in the Charter. The
central idea which allowed courts to favour the ruling classes over the
centuries - namely that class and history do not count, that all
individuals are, for adjudicative purposes, the same, whether they are
rich or poor, male or female, white or black - is replicated. The
results thus far show the regrettable impact of these truths, especially
in the areas where capital and labour clash directly, that is, where
(rich, propertied) individuals are confronted by (poor, property-less)
individuals who have formed collectives;
(iv) Whatever the Charter's goals are, one directive is that the claims
of rights and freedoms are to be made against the state, not against
private individuals. While the distinction between the public and private
realms is far from clear and, therefore, will be hard to maintain, the
concept involved is detrimental to the would-be progressive use of the
Charter. It focusses concentration on the state as the oppressor; it
suggests that, politically, the real danger to democracy and to individual
welfare and sovereignty is the tyranny of the majority. Again, I will
not stop to examine the full implications of this conceptualization. A
few points will have to suffice. First, the minorities which are said to
need this Charter protection form the core of the progressive lawyers'
clientele. If the differences between them were seen as being less
important than the things which they have in common, namely, their
Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 51 Alta L.R. (2d) 97. and the right to strike cases:
Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta), Labour Relations Act
(Alta) and Police Officers Collective Bargaining Act (Alta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313,
[1987] 3 W.W.R. 577; P.S.A.C. v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 249;
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Locals 544, 496, 635 and 955 v.
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 277. The piece also argues
that R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449, and section 15
jurisprudence have provided relatively little by way of amelioration. For a detailed
critique and thorough analysis of the abortion and equality issues, see M. Mandel,
Trm CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND TIE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS IN CANADA (Toronto:
Wall & Thompson, 1989).
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lack of property and their exploitation which serves the wealthy, they
could be seen as the majority. The only true minority with an under-
lying commonality of interests would be identified: the wealthy. Is this
what we fear: that this minority of the wealthy might be tyrannized
by the now-oppressed majority? Second, even if it is granted (as it
should be) that there is cause to be worried because our existing
democratic processes might lead to the oppression of different-thinking
and different-looking people, why would we not improve those dem-
ocratic institutions rather than seek amelioration by reaching out to the
most unaccountable, elitist institution we have? Third, another way to
question the oppression of minorities by the unwashed majority argu-
ment on which Charter proponents rely, is to note the upside-down
effects generated by Charter politics. I will give only one instance.
Trade unions, to protect workers' interests, have pursued closed shop
arrangements. Their denial of membership to a worker is easily char-
acterized as an exercise of a majority's tyrannical will, denying a
dissenting or different kind of individual the sacred right to work. A
Charter challenge by a disaffected worker is plausible, even though,
in the long run, the logic of the industrial relations' scheme may doom
it to failure. The denial of work to that individual by an employer for
something called economic reasons, however, is untouchable by the
Charter. Yet, that is where the real problem lies. The Charter makes
the union the potential enemy of workers. The ironic logic of all of
this is that the union, to win these kinds of cases, has to argue that
its activities are those of a private, commercial actor beyond the scope
of the Charter, rather than those of a political organization whose goal
is to further the working classes' political causes.16
The public/private distinction, in association with the emotion-
tugging appeals to protect hopeless individuals and minorities from the
tyranny of the reactionary, unthinking masses, inheres in the use of
the Charter and constitutes a serious roadblock to its progressive use.
This does not mean that Charter politics can never yield positive
results. After all, the very abstract nature of the rights and freedoms
"balloons"' 7 may well cause them to be filled up with useful stuff
every now and again. But, the emphasis is on "every now and again".
To exploit these good results they must be sold as legitimate ones to
the politicians who have to act on them. This means that all Charter
results must be treated with respect. As most will be harmful to the
oppressed of this world, this is not politically useful. Nor is the fact
that, as I noted, to win, progressive lawyers may have to use reac-
tionary arguments. Inasmuch as proponents of Charter litigation think
of these as educational/organizational exercises because the courts
16 See Lavigne, ibid.
17 The expression and idea comes from P.H. Russell, Canada's Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: A Political Report [1988] PUBLIC LAW 385.
[Vol. 21:2
The Progressive Use of Law
provide a forum for the advocacy of symbolically useful political
arguments, the political utility of obtaining "good" language from
judges in losing causes will be dampened by the fact that often "bad"
language will be used by courts who bestow victories. At best, this is
a tendentious kind of politics.
I must enter a caveat at this point. My pessimistic analysis stems
from my view that most of today's ills are traceable to the fact that
Canada is a class-divided society. There are many progressive people
who believe this to be too crude an approach. They argue that
patriarchy and race are causes of much of the oppression and discrim-
ination which exists. And they are. My antagonism to the use of the
Charter may have caused me to underemphasize this point. All I can
offer in this brief presentation is the assertion that class analysis may
be more useful than a more particularistic race or gender approach to
the question of whether or not Charter litigation constitutes progressive
politics. However, as I know this to be contentious, I will satisfy
myself with making lesser debating points which, I feel, help bolster
my position.
The results of Charter politics so far suggest that the public/
private distinction, the emphasis on abstract, individual rights and the
judiciary's institutional inability to provide positive relief have not
been at all helpful to feminist causes. 18 A great deal of money and
organizational effort has been poured into legal politics which might
well have yielded better results if marshalled for efforts in the wider
political sphere. This leads to an associated argument, one raised
earlier in this talk. I suggested that lawyers who depend on the state
for funding will be curtailed if they prove dangerous. It is of some
interest that much of the funding to use the Charter for progressive
causes by organizations such as Legal Education and Action Fund
(LEAF) comes from the state. Is it possible that the state understands
full well that Charter challenges are not radical in nature?
In the end, progressive lawyers would be better off to avoid
Charter politics. Rather, they should use the arguments which inhere
in law and use them as the basis for attacking the support mechanisms
of capitalism. This can be done because it is in the nature of legal
reasoning never to admit that the existing rules, doctrines and principles
18 In fact, some feminists who urge the use of the Charter have acknowledged
the poor record they have compiled: see Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of
Women, COMMUNIQUE, 17 April 1989; K. Ruff, The Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms: A Tool for Social Justice? (1989) 13:2 PERCEPTION 19. For critical
analysis by progressive lawyers of how women have fared under the Charter, see A.
Petter, supra, note 6; J. Fudge, supra, note 6; J. Fudge, The Effect of Entrenching a
Bill of Rights Upon Political Discourse: Feminist Demands and Sexual Violence in
Canada (1989) INTERNATIONAL J. OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW [forthcoming, available
on request]. This last piece shows that women have suffered losses under the Charter
with respect to advances they had made legislatively in respect of rules which govern
the conduct of sexual offence trials.
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favour one group over another. Once it is understood how these legal
rules reinforce capitalism, they are to be used to exploit the contradic-
tions which the papering-over of substantive differences inevitably
creates. The best place to wage this kind of warfare is outside the
courtrooms. Even though one does not need lawyers once the fight is
removed from the courts, progressive lawyers are useful to such a
project because they have an intimate knowledge of the way in which
law supports capitalism; this knowledge can provide a sound basis for
activism. This approach makes lawyers feel less like lawyers and they
are prone to resist this line of attack. Nonetheless, I think it is the
most useful thing a progressive lawyer can do. Just as it is positive
for such progressive lawyers only to use the Charter when it is foisted
upon them and to discourage their clients from using it to change the
world, it is positive for progressive lawyers to expose the way the law
perpetuates inequality and to help develop a legal politics approach on
the basis of that understanding. I offer a few suggested lines of attack.
One of the central ways in which law helps maintain capitalist
relations of production is by inhibiting any inquiry into how sacrosanct
private property rights were acquired. Yet, there is no moral argument
which underpins the legal sanctioning of the original capture of prop-
erty rights. As to new property rights, the only question which the
law permits to be asked is as to whether or not they have been acquired
by means of a legally acceptable contract, transaction or gift. 19 Con-
sequently, when people are adversely affected by the possession and/
or use of property by its owners, they are given a very burdensome
onus to discharge. They are required to prove that the owners of
private property exercised their property rights improperly. This puts
non-property owners behind the eight ball. I suggest, therefore, that
progressive lawyers push for a reversal of the onus of proof in all
circumstances where such an argument can be made sensibly. It is true
that, in some cases, this will not attack capitalism squarely but, if this
tactic could be universalized, real benefits are obtainable. A brief
sketch of the theoretical basis on which such claims can be made and
of the potential advantages the reversal of the onus of proof would
offer follows.
The conventional justification for imposing the burden of proof
in the way it is done by the judiciary pervades most of our decision-
making bodies. It is said to be an argument of convenience: the person
who asserts must prove. The perceived difficulty is that, if it were
otherwise, innocent actors would be selected at random by aggrieved
citizens seeking some redress, from someone, from anyone, for their
19 See B. Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology (1980-81) 33 STANFORD
L. REv. 753.
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ills. 20 Moreover, it is harder to prove a negative than a positive, or so
it is argued. The argument is that it is harder to prove that harm was
not caused by one's act than it is to prove that harm was caused to
one by a particular act of another. A victim is assumed to be in the
best position to gather the data (note the prominent position given to
notions of capitalist incentives here) as to how the harm was inflicted.
Whatever one thinks of the merits of these arguments in a setting
where individuals are supposed to sue other individuals, that is, the
property, contract and torts judicial setting,21 why should these argu-
ments be thought to be applicable in other settings? For example, why
should we not assume that occupational harm is due to profit-garnering
activities and hold these activities responsible until they are proved to
be otherwise? If convenience is the justification for imposing the burden
of proof on the plaintiffs in contract and tort situations, there is a
compelling argument for reversing the burden of proof in the context
of occupational or environmental harm infliction. By definition, in
these contexts the victims are not as well-positioned to establish causal
connections between harm and the usage made of unknown substances
and complex processes by conscious economic actors as those who are
in control of the selection and usage of the processes and substances.22
20 This kind of argument is typical of law: it is a flood-gate argument, one
which appeals primarily to paranoia and only secondarily to logic. Further, it has
embedded in it a value which is unspoken and, therefore, unchallenged - it assumes
that it would be wrong for innocent victims to be compensated unless they can find
a person at fault, whatever that may mean. And, if you scratch the surface a little
further you find another real fear, namely that aggrieved and uncompensated victims
might do what every plaintiff's lawyer does right now: look for a rich potential
defendant rather than a truly faulty one. It ig obvious that this would imperil property
owners in a way that they are not now imperilled.
21 It may be a more useful concept in the criminal law setting where it means
that the state, being treated as an individual, has a burden. But as criminal defence
lawyers know, the burden of proof imposition in criminal cases is rendered almost
nugatory by the facts of life. Accused people are poor people; this leads to guilty
pleas. In addition, the biases of lower level court judges with respect to credibility
issues favour the prosecution witnesses despite the burden of proof rules. There are
also real disadvantages for accused people who have prior convictions, despite the
burden of proof rules. Incidentally, this has been reinforced by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada, armed with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; see R.
v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670, 41 C.C.C. (3d) 385.
22 It is only lawyers and, of course, the self-interested parties whom they
represent, who would think an argument that it has not yet been proven that Inco's
emissions of sulphur dioxide are related to acid rain is anything but inane. Note also
the stereotypical result of this kind of argument: it leads to a reification which serves
capitalism well, namely that the substance or process (contrast a human being) is
innocent until proven guilty. In some areas of the law, the burden of proof is de
facto shifted, for the very reasons that are offered in the text. Thus, in products'
liability cases, while the de jure burden rests with the victim, in fact the producer
would be very foolish not to seek to establish that it took all reasonable care. The
advantage of a reversed onus of proof has been brought out by R. Sullivan, Trespass
to the Person in Canada: A Defence of the Traditional Approach (1987) 19 OTtAWA
L. REv. 533.
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It can be anticipated that, as the argument of convenience makes no
sense in the kind of setting which we have just been discussing,
defenders of the status quo who are beleaguered by the progressive
lawyers' aggressive argument for a reversal of the burden of proof,
will use a fall-back position. Most likely, this would entail arguing
that a reversal of the onus of proof would inhibit economic activity
because property owners would not be as enterprising as they now are
in the use of their property. This is, in fact, the real argument
underlying the existing burden of proof rules. But if we can force this
argument to become the principal and explicit defence of those who
insist on the burden of proof remaining as it is, a victory of sorts will
have been won. It will no longer be a perfectly moral justification to
use private property as the owner decides. Rather, the argument will
be that the owner should be permitted to do so because it is econom-
ically inefficient to make certain people - property owners/enterprisers
- bear the full costs of using their private property as they decide,
even if this imposes costs on the workers or neighbours they affect by
their whimsical and selfish uses. 23 If the debate takes place in this
context, it could be argued that Pareto-type efficiency is not everything
and that there are other values.
The issue that common property is a value to be protected would,
thus, be put on the agenda in a way that it seldom is now. The rights
of the victims (workers, neighbours, and so on) could be said to be
based on the right to have clean ambient air, clean water, a noiseless
surrounding; the property which no one single person owns would start
off with as good a claim to be sacrosanct as does the property right
allocated to private individuals. The absolutism of private property
ownership could be questioned.24 In this sense, then, arguments to
augment strict liability schemes become very important. They should
be used as levers for universalizing the idea of reversing the onus of
proof. Thus, progressive lawyers should be in the forefront of com-
prehensive no-fault accident and disease compensation schemes not
because they will, by themselves, bring capitalism to its knees, 25 but
23 I will not digress here, but it can be relatively easily shown that, in the
aggregate, economic benefits would ensue from reversing the onus of proof in the
way that I argue it should be. See P. Rohan & B. Brody, Frequency and Costs of
Work Accidents in North America, 1971- 80 (1984) 9 LABOUR AND SOCIETY 165; see
also R. Kazis and R. Grossman, FEAR AT WORK: JOB BLACKMAIL, LABOR AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982) at 18-35.
24 Here I note that attempts to put property into the Charter as a fundamental
right and freedom is a real ideological threat. While courts already protect private
property rights without such entrenchment, should entrenchment occur, an argument
that property owned in common is as deserving as private property rights would be
much harder to make. Further, note that the tactic suggested leads to the development
of a language to claim concrete rights to well-being, rather than the abstract rights
provided for in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This, too, would be impeded
by specific entrenchment of private property rights.
25 "No-fault" with respect to traumatic injuries has left New Zealand capitalism
alive and well.
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because they address problems as social rather than individual ones.
Furthermore, such schemes lead to a greater socialization of costs and
tend to arrest the accumulation of capital in private hands by making
it logical to have state insurance, rather than private insurance, schemes.
Social insurance, quite simply, is cheaper, a powerfully persuasive
argument in a capitalist economy. Once an insurance scheme becomes
state-run, it becomes politically possible to seek to direct the disposition
of its funds (although, of course, in a capitalist state, it is not easy for
the working classes to capture the state even to this limited extent).
In addition, and not incidentally, such schemes will benefit the working
classes as a whole, in the sense that compensation will be far more
evenly and widely spread than it is now.
What does this line of argument mean for progressive lawyers in
practical terms? How should they act? I believe that if the foregoing
analysis is accepted, then, using no-fault as an example, certain
strategies and tactics become self-evident. In working toward the
objective, there should be an attempt to debunk private insurance, to
de-mystify judicial decision-making in torts,26 and to act politically in
support of comprehensive schemes which assume that integrity of limb
and life is a paramount value in our society. This would put the onus
on those whose activities threaten the integrity of life and limb to
defend their unholy position. This strategy requires support for com-
prehensive disability schemes, public pension plans, sick pay, paid
paternity and maternity leave, and so forth27 - once the analysis is
accepted, a co-ordinated set of tactics in related areas suggest them-
selves.
Let me give some other examples. In the consumer setting, the
argument ought to be made that anyone who buys a product is entitled
to have it replaced as soon as it is found to be defective, with the
26 For example, this could be accomplished by showing how ineffective the
torts system is as a deterrent; how uneven it is, how unfair, how sexist, and so on.
All of this can be done on the basis of decided cases. See Glasbeek & Hasson,
supra, note 8, and on the basis of results; see Report submitted to the Minister of
Labour, PROTECTING THE WORKER FROM DISABILITY: CHALLENGES FOR THE EIGHTIES
by P. Weiler (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1983) at 53-83; T. Ison, THE
FORENSIC LOTTERY (London: Staples Press, 1967).
27 It is in this context in particular (but not exclusively), that I would argue
that well-meaning people who challenge the pre-emptive nature of workers' compen-
sation legislation are seriously misguided. More recently, a report to the government
of Ontario recommended improvements in welfare benefits' delivery: see Ontario,
REPORT OF THE SOCIAL ASSISTANCE REvIEW COMMrrTEE (Thompson Report) (Toronto:
Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1988). Progressive lawyers were at the forefront of the
movement urging the government to implement the recommendations of the Report.
However, they all but ignored that part of the Report recommending a comprehensive
disability compensation scheme, which, if implemented, would reduce the welfare
rolls considerably. This is a good illustration of how a failure to engage in a thorough
analysis of the way in which law works can hinder the development of truly effective
strategies.
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onus shifting to the retailer and/or manufacturer to show that it was
abused. More important, perhaps, is the idea of changing the onus of
proof in the workplace. In that situation it ought to be argued that,
until the employer has proven that it had a right to discipline a worker,
the employer must continue paying the worker of whom it disapproves.
As well, a worker should be entitled to close down a production line
until the employer proves to everyone's satisfaction (workers, the state)
that the workplace is safe. Until this is done, all employees should
continue to be paid.28
In this way, daily legal-political facts can be manipulated so as
to make a difference. Note that these arguments can be made within
the framework of accepted legal reasoning. For instance, in the case
of the consumer, it is just as easy, if not easier, for the manufacturer
and/or retailer to prove that goods were reasonably manufactured and/
or stored, than it is for the plaintiff to prove that they were not. The
argument to be met will be that consumers will abuse this new power
of enforcement of their rights. This can be countered by a typical legal
riposte: use litigation costs as a deterrent to consumers who might act
as vexatious litigants. From an economic efficiency point of view,
those retailers who devised means to verify that the goods in question
left their care in good condition would obtain a competitive advantage.
In this way, all the arguments supporting the status quo could be used
to support a position in direct opposition to it.
Reversal of the onus of proof is a useful organizing principle, but
it is not the only one. It is part of a more general set of tactics with
the central theme of using those aspects of law which, if pushed to
their extreme, will create pressures on capitalism. Taking the argument
into those areas of law with which I am most familiar will clarify this
point. Some of the tactics are Saul Alinsky-like, that is, they are
28 At the time of writing, the Ontario government is proposing that specially
certified workers be allowed to stop production lines when workers' lives are
endangered. The impetus for the proposal is that the existing scheme (which imposes
the burden of proving that workers are endangered on the government and on the
workers) has made carnage in the workplace a human tragedy and a political albatross
for governments. The remedy offered, however, will leave an employer representative
free to countermand a certified worker's order - the burden has hardly been shifted.
Furthermore, any certified worker's decision to stop the production line will mean
that their colleagues will be left without pay. The real burden will still be imposed
on workers. See Bill 208(G), Occupational Health and Safety Statute Law Amendment
Act, 1989, 2nd Sess., 34th Leg. Ont. 1989. Acceptance of the argument in the text
would cause progressive lawyers to react to this proposed amendment and to be in
the forefront of the fight to bring these issues to the public's attention. Some trade
unionists have raised these arguments. See N. De Carlo, The Right to Refuse Bill
208 (May 1989) OUR TIMES 9; see also B. De Matteo, Bill 208 May be Dangerous
to Your Health (Summer 1988) WOSH NEws 1. But, as this is a non-litigious sphere,
it does not seem to have attracted lawyers' attention, with the notable exception of
the Toronto Workers' Health & Safety Legal Clinic, which submitted a brief to the
government on this issue in November 1988 [available upon request].
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guerilla-like tactics. It must be remembered that the argument is that
we cannot use existing law and its institutions as instruments of
revolution. They can be used, however, in such a way as to heighten
contradictions in a meaningful way. The best we can do, as lawyers,
is to raise consciousness about the way law and its functionaries have
helped create a hegemony which makes the inequality in our polity
look natural.
In labour law, there is little that a lawyer can do about the reality
of the inequality of bargaining power which exists as a result of the
fact that a few own the means of production and the many must sell
their labour power. In the long run, this can only be changed by the
working classes themselves. Yet, in part, their weakened position and
their lack of co-ordination is due to the effects of the ideology of law.
Workers are often educated to this effect by their trade unions and
believe in the values said to be reflected in law. They adhere, with
oft-proclaimed pride, to notions of trust, to the idea that contracts
should be honoured and that fair processes (in particular grievance
arbitration) should be supported by them. The values of trust and
fairness are worthy ones indeed but, as they are to be given life by
capitalist law, in practice they turn out to be inimical to working class
interests. The values of adherence to voluntarily entered-into contracts
and of the commitment to fair processes are promoted in a setting
where workers are fettered by severe legal limitations on their use of
economic power, whereas the employer faces no equivalent restrictions.
For example, strikes can only take place during given periods. While
it is true that there is a similar restriction on lock-outs, the employer
can always take its collective goods and walk out, something which
workers, as a collective unit, cannot do. Similarly, trade unions are
limited in the use of their co-ordinated strength to a particular em-
ployer's enterprise, whereas there is no limit on integrated capitalist
activity.29 Similarly, employers, though acting as individuals, often
hold themselves out to represent large segments of the corporate sector.
They can, and often do, threaten a capitalist strike against the state by
saying, as individuals, that they will not invest because they lack
confidence. They are merely stating their opinion and their intention
about the development of their goods. Legally, Canadian trade unions
cannot threaten economic action of a co-ordinated kind when they
29 In Ontario, when the steelworkers were battling Radio Shack, the Steel-
workers local was limited to its local economic power. The workers in Barrie could
not rely on all of the Steelworkers' members all over Canada and the United States
to remove their labour from all of Radio Shack's stores. Radio Shack was not so
limited; it could call on the administrative and financial support of its parent company,
the mighty Tandy Corporation. But it was not just administrative support it could
obtain; it could also get direct economic support by shifting inventories to, getting
supplies and importing financial and physical assistance from, these related entities.
Thus, there is no real limitation on capital's mobility and integrated power but there
is on the use of collective labour power.
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want to obtain benefits from the state. Similarly, when an employer
decides to act on its wishes during the life of a collective agreement,
disputing workers must accept an employer's decision and then litigate
it; that is, they must obey now and grieve later. This formula is not a
favourable one for workers. 30
The traditional uses to which law is put cannot help very much
to redress these imbalances. But, the understanding that "neutral,
facilitating" law has contributed significantly to the maintenance of
the inequalities does suggest some tactics which might put a little
pressure on the fundaments of capitalist relations, thereby heightening
workers' awareness. This is a necessary first step. What follows are a
few examples of the kind of tactics which might be worth engaging
in as a progressive labour lawyer. None of these leads us to the courts
or, indeed, requires professional skills other than critical insight:
(i) The content of any prerogative or management clause is, de facto,
always in contention during any negotiation and in the administration
of the collective agreement. But its scope is very wide in Canada,
given the structural impediments which exist (a limited right to strike,
the unions' acceptance of the culture of arbitral jurisprudence and their
belief in the sanctity of contract). There is very little that can be done
through the collective bargaining mechanism, then, to attack the man-
agerial rights embedded in any collective agreement situation. How-
ever, it is possible to try to set an agenda which will lead to a change
of attitude of (a) arbitrators, (b) trade unions and (c) eventually,
workers themselves. One idea is to ask for changes in contract lan-
guage. The argument would be that "prerogatives" belong to gods,
despots or kings, not to human beings who call themselves employers.
Therefore, while negotiating, trade unions should be urged to ask for
a retitling of the prerogative of management clause. The demand should
be that it be called, for example, "the limitations on workers' rights
clause". The implication of such a demand would be that workers
have inherent rights which are not recognized by the specific provisions
of the collective agreement, rather than that employers have inherent
rights which have been cut down by employee demands. As well as
making a small, but useful, political point, such language would also
permit a legal argument to be mounted to the effect that the employer
ought to bear the burden of proof when it claims the right to change
work conditions during the life of an agreement. In the same vein,
trade unions ought to be encouraged to have other clauses renamed.
For example, health and safety clauses might be labelled: "limitations
on the rights of the employer to maim workers"; seniority clauses
might be renamed: "the rationalization of the employer's right to lay-
30 See H. Glasbeek, The Utility of Model Building - Collins' Capitalist
Discipline and Corporalist Law (1984) 13 INDusT. L.J. 133.
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off, promote and demote employees". Note that these would be rela-
tively cost-free battles. Progressive lawyers and/or trade unions would
tell workers why they are asking for these new names for standard
collective agreement provisions. Then, by finding out how fiercely
employers will resist them (as they will), consciousness may be raised
without having to ask workers to go on strike or to suffer. In addition,
this tactic emphasizes that bargaining about language is not just a
question of professionalism or legalism. This would be a giant step
forward. If lawyers take this stand they would be helping to provide
a much-needed political education.
(ii) While negotiating agreements, trade unions should be told that
they ought to negotiate at the place of work, in an open forum, if at
all possible. At the moment, trade unions occasionally report back to
their membership during negotiations; the employer does so every
night. This is important because many trade unionists have a view of
what is reasonable, a view informed by their acceptance of a managerial
role for unions, which, in turn, is enhanced by their sense of being
professionals. All too often they bargain away demands which they
consider to be silly claims made by workers from the shop floor. An
on-site and open negotiation process would force professional unionists
to take workers more seriously - if it turns out that trade unions have
been right about the futility of making certain claims, they will have
the opportunity to educate their workforce accordingly. Again, the
lawyer's role would be one of political education by explaining and
supporting the legal right of trade unions to conduct their affairs in a
more grass-roots-oriented way.
(iii) Likewise, grievance arbitration should always take place where
the dispute arose and should be open to the workers. Lawyers should
strongly suggest this concept to their clients. This would enable
workers to see various aspects of the "justice" of the system, for
example, its emphasis on legalism: the application of hearsay rules,
refusal to let a grievor give evidence, removal of witnesses from
hearings, and so on. In addition, it will save on costs and emphasize
the trivial nature of much of the so-called professional know-how
which lawyers promote.
(iv) Grievance arbitration should not be permitted to contribute to the
wealth of lawyers and arbitrators (who are frequently lawyers). Trade
unions should be encouraged to refuse to pay more than a particular
fee. Note that, unless the unions agree to an arbitrator, there can be
no grievance arbitration system. They are in a good bargaining posi-
tion. Furthermore, individual employers are not vigorously opposed to
paying cheaper rates. Inasmuch as the argument would be that "good"
people would no longer be available, it is the job of progressive
lawyers to show workers that the professionalism which they are
currently buying at considerable expense is bringing them very poor
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results. For instance, in discipline and discharge cases, workers win
everything they ask for roughly seventeen percent of the time; if partial
victories are included, they would roughly break even; but partial
victories are also partial losses or, if you will, partial employer
victories. 31 These results are appalling. Once workers have become
aware of this, they will appreciate any tactic which diminishes the
cost of the process and which will give them more control.
(v) Every effort should be made to ensure that grievance arbitration is
a process which belongs to the workers. Accordingly, lawyers should
be active in promoting trade union by-laws and processes which ensure
that an elected grievance arbitration committee should not only raise
the issue of a grievance, but should be able to fight it right through to
the grievance arbitration itself. This approach could help answer the
oft-heard plea for structural changes in trade union organization. There
is, after all, no good reason why unions should adopt the hierarchical
model of employer structures, which is what they presently do with
respect to the grievance arbitration process. 32
The kind of strategies which are being suggested ought to be
manifest by now. They consist of using the existing system to empha-
size, firstly, the value of democratic practices, and secondly, the
limitations on workers' rights, which stand in direct contradiction to
the claims being made both by employers and deceived (and self-
deceived) trade unions.
A similar line of argument can be made with respect to the use
and application of criminal law in our capitalist political economy. A
real difficulty for progressive lawyers in this area is that they are
defending unemployed and semi-employed people against the applica-
tion of law which protects property rights, as well as certain kinds of
bourgeois morality (that is, anti-freedom of choice, anti-drug, anti-
pornography). More often than not, the progressive lawyer is forced
to make points about overwhelming and unacceptable police conduct
3' See G.W. Adams, GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION OF DISCHARGE CASES (Kingston:
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1979) at 42ff; J. Stanton, LABOUR
ARBITRATION: BOON OR BANE FOR UNIONS (Vancouver: Butterworth, 1984); P.
McDermott and I are undertaking a study of ten years of private sector grievance
arbitration in Ontario and the preliminary results yielded by a check of the results in
the first two and one-half years of the 10 year sample tally with the numbers cited
in the text.
32 Typically the steps in a grievance arbitration process are that a worker raises
an issue which goes to a grievance committee member, who then takes it to the
grievance committee, who then takes it to a union representative, who then takes it
to a full-time trade union grievance arbitration administrator. This mirrors the hier-
archical structure on the other side: foreman, supervisor, personnel manager, and so
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and about biased and unfair judicial and administrative processes. 33 All
of this, by definition, is defensive. It does nothing about reallocating
resources of law enforcement; it does nothing about creating more
efficient and helpful regulatory systems inhibiting socially harmful
activity such as consumer fraud, the production of poor quality products
and services, the pollution of the environment and the infliction of
occupational harm. This sphere of regulation is to be left to adminis-
trative agencies which have very poor enforcement powers and which,
occasionally, impose low penalties on offenders in non-stigmatizing
processes. In addition, these agencies are given confusing guidelines
because they are meant to enhance private capital accumulation while
legitimating activities which lead to such accumulation. Very seldom
are criteria set up by the state which indicate how the balance between
these contradictory aims is to be struck. The balancing is done in a
relatively private setting, with an imbalance in resources between the
lobbyists-capitalists, on the one hand, and workers-consumers, on the
other, making the outcomes inevitably disastrous. This quick summary
of how it is that so much goes wrong with our society34 raises a
question as to how a progressive lawyer might seek to show that much
of what is seen as normal capitalist activity is, in fact, criminal activity,
as defined by the existing legal system. If this can be done, attention
can be drawn to the fact that an economic system relying on the profit
motive as its basic incentive will not adequately supply needs and may
leave a trail of innocent victims in its wake. How can lawyers aid in
mounting such an attack?
As you may know, I teach a course called "The Corporation as
Criminal". It is my hope that it may help to prepare people for such
a challenge. It basically makes the argument that, given the normal
definitions found in the Criminal Code, many economic actors are
recidivist criminals. This can be shown relatively easily by pointing
out that in Fortune's list of the 500 largest corporations, forty percent
do not breach statutes or existing laws in any one year. That is, sixty
percent do! Moreover, they do so very frequently. Inasmuch as they
are recorded as offenders, they are punished by having licensing fees
called fines levied against them. They are set at a very low level and,
most frequently, imposed on the corporation rather than on the flesh
and blood profiteers who benefit from the corporations' activities and
who often manage them. This is quite unacceptable. In many contexts,
the nature of the offence is a deeply perturbing one. To return to my
favourite setting, health and safety, the infringement of the physical
33 Of course, the impetus to make these arguments has been increased by the
legal rights included in the Charter, as the likelihood of success is enhanced. Who
is not tempted by the chance to win against the police, the bureaucracy or the
legislators? But, the extent to which poor people will be protected from the rigours
and stringency of the criminal law is very dubious, see supra, the text of note 9.
34 For a much longer argument to this effect, see Glasbeek, The Need to Make
"Profits" a Dirty Word, supra, note 12. The facts and figures which follow in the
text are documented in more detail in that article.
19891
Ottawa Law ReviewlRevue de droit d'Ottawa
integrity of workers is seen as a materialized risk of generally beneficial
activity, a risk supposedly shared between the employer and the worker.
It is acknowledged that, sometimes, worker harm is due to an em-
ployer's overzealous drive for profits. The fact that the legal system
is not repelled by this set of propositions is due to the notion that
workers have sold their labour power and, therefore, have, in some
sense, consented to the harm inflicted on their persons. This view can
be shown to be an outrageous distortion of the normal, liberal-moral
precepts on which criminal law is said to be based. A powerful
polemical and legal argument can be mounted to the effect that real
crimes are committed at the work site. I make that argument as follows.
If a sadist promises a needy person ten dollars if that person lets
the sadist punch her on the nose, that needy person can, even after
receiving the ten dollars, go to a court and ensure that the contract
not be enforced because it is an illegal contract: no one can consent
to the infliction of violence on her person. Not only that, it is such an
immoral contract that the court will let the loss lie where it falls and
permit the potential victim to keep the ten dollars. Why is it then
acceptable to argue that workers, for a notional amount of premium
pay, have accepted an extra risk in their workplace? 35 Analogies of
this kind are relatively easy to make in other areas.
This kind of argument can be added to by showing that the
economic cost of corporate criminality is fantastically high. In 1974,
in the United States, it was estimated that corporate crime cost the
nation something like forty billion dollars, many times the cost of
"ordinary" crime in respect of which so much of the nation's law
enforcement resources are spent.36 In addition, I have already alluded
15 In R. v. Bergner (1987), 78 A.R. 331, 53 Alta L.R. (2d) 159 (C.A.), the
Court held that there can be consent to an assault where the physical violation is the
result of a fight and the physical force used is somehow proportionate. This only
reinforces the argument in the text. If, to be rendered non-criminal, the workplace
situation is to be analogized to a bar-room fight, the basic conflictual nature of
employer-worker relationships is made manifest, for all to see! Any notion that liberal
pluralist theorizing adequately explains labour law's inequalities would disappear. See
H. Glasbeek, A Role for Criminal Sanctions in Occupational Health qnd Safety, in
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (Cowansville, Qu6: Les Editions Yvon
Blais, 1989) 125.
36 In a HANDBOOK ON WurrE-COLLAR CRIME (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1974) the U.S. Chamber of Commerce reported the cost of white
collar crime (very narrowly defined) as $42 billion, ten times the total amount taken
in all thefts reported in the EB.I. Index and 250 times the amount taken in all bank
robberies in the U.S. in that year. See J.H. Reiman, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE
POOR GET PRISON: IDEOLOGY, CLASS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, 1979) at 106ff; see also M.B. Clinard & P.C. Yeager, CORPORATE CRIME
(New York: The Free Press, 1980); United States of America, Task Force Report of
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice,
CRIME AND ITS IMPACT - AN ASSESSMENT (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1967); J.E. Conklin, ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL: BusINEss CRIME IN AMERICA
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1977); S. Box, POWER, CRIME AND
MYSTIFICATION (London: Tavistock Publications, 1983).
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to the fact that the law allows corporations to take the brunt of the
blame whenever profit-oriented activity causes harm to society as a
result of criminal behaviour. This is done both to avoid stigmatization
of the actual profiteers and to shield the real wrongdoers from those
same penalties which are imposed regularly on the poor in our society.
A gross example of this was the Amway case.
The Amway Corporation had deliberately defrauded Customs and
Excise of Canada to the tune of many millions of dollars over many
years. The court found that the two major shareholders and directors
were conspiratorial lepers but, as the Crown had permitted charges
against them to be dropped in return for a guilty plea by the corpo-
ration, no punishment could be imposed on them. The company was
fined an enormous amount of money in absolute terms but, in relative
terms, it was like a slap on the wrist. In particular, note that the two
owners who were condemned by the court were among the four richest
men in the United States. Moreover, they were Reagan supporters and,
after the corporation's conviction, Reagan appeared with them on a
political podium although they had had to conceal (as a result of the
conviction) that the corporation was paying for the meeting. Shortly
thereafter they hired former U.S. Secretary of State, General Haig, as
a "consultant". 37
I tell this story in this way to show that the capitalist classes are
well aware that stigmatization is dangerous for their activities and that
they will seek to counter it in as strenuous a manner as they can. 38
There is no reason why progressive lawyers should, therefore, not seek
to exploit this potential weakness. They should insist that charges
always be laid against individuals. This can be done, using either a
regulatory regime or the Criminal Code. Furthermore, while the wrong-
doers who committed the criminal acts may be low-level functionaries
in the corporation, a legally acceptable argument can be made to go
after major shareholders who are in a position to control the activities
of the corporation's employees. I have teased out that argument
elsewhere, and I will not weary you with technicalities. But do note
that to get at the real owners of corporations makes sense in Canada
where 322 of the major 400 companies on the TSE are controlled by
one or two major owners. 39
37 Glasbeek, The Need to Make "Profits" a Dirty Word, supra, note 12.
38 The Ford Pinto story illustrates this. Ford Motor Co. spent more money and
effort on defending the criminal charges against it than it expended on hundreds of
private law suits it faced as the result of its exploding car. When Ford was acquitted,
General Motors sent it a congratulatory telegram and the Reagan adminstration bought
up all the remaining Ford Pintos it had in stock; see B. Fisse & J. Braithwaite, THE
IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPOnRE OFFENDERS (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1983); M. Dowie, Pinto Madness in S.L. Hills, ed., CORPORATE
VIOLENCE: INJtRY AND DEATH FOR PROFT (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman & Little-
field, 1987).
39 Glasbeek, The Need to Make "Profits" a Dirty Word, supra, note 12.
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All of this suggests that progressive lawyers, as well as defending
their ordinary clientele in criminal cases, should seek to become
prosecutors of the real wrongdoers in our society. This would mean
that, for a change, they would be setting the agenda. It may cause the
state to allocate its law enforcement resources quite differently. A
tangential benefit of such a reallocation would be that progressive
lawyers' normal clientele would be less harassed. More importantly,
however, progressive lawyers, by having corporate criminals prose-
cuted, would advance the necessary political attack on the legitimacy
of profit-making. Profit would become a less noble motive. Such tactics
could diminish the reification of corporations, a fact which obscures
the reality of class relations in our society. In turn, this may alter a
perception the working classes have of this society which, I fear, is
the prevailing one: that this is a consensual, non-class society.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, despite my reservations about some tactics, I do believe
that progressive lawyers have a role to play. But what is needed is
serious analysis of the function and purposes of capitalist law. It is
only after this has been done that strategies can be devised which,
while compatible with the logic of the system, attack it at its extremes,
creating the kinds of dialectic tensions which may help to undermine
the system. The task, then, is to find those points which will touch
the nerve centres of the material advantages created by the law for
capitalism and capitalists. That is where the action is.
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